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Cross-World Comparatives for Modal Realists 
ROBERT MICHELS1 
ABSTRACT: Divers (2014) argues that a Lewisian theory of modality which includes 
both counterpart theory and modal realism cannot account for the truth of certain intu-
itively true modal sentences involving cross-world comparatives. The main purpose of 
this paper is to defend the Lewisian theory against Divers’s challenge by developing a 
response strategy based on a degree-theoretic treatment of comparatives and by show-
ing that this treatment is compatible with the theory. 
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realism – modality. 
1. Divers’s challenge to a Lewisian theory of modality 
 My aim in this paper is to answer a challenge for Lewis’s theory of 
modality, consisting of modal realism plus counterpart theory,2 which  
has recently been raised in Divers (2014). The basis of Divers’s objection 
are certain intuitively true sentences containing modal comparatives such 
as: 
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2  For the main statement and defence of modal realism, see Lewis (1986), for coun-
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 (1)  It is true of the tallest actual thing that it might have been taller. 
 (2)  It is true of the fastest actual thing that it might have been faster. 
 (3)  It is true of the actually longest lasting thing that it might have 
lasted longer. 
I will focus on (1) from now on, but the crucial claims made throughout 
the paper generalize. According to counterpart theory, (1) is true if, and 
only if, the tallest actual thing has a counterpart which is even taller. This 
counterpart can either be an object which exists in the actual world or one 
which exists in a merely possible world. There is no actual thing taller than 
the tallest actual thing, so the required counterpart must exist in a merely 
possible world. This can, argues Divers, not be the case, since i) two objects 
need to be spatiotemporally related in order for them to stand in the ‘taller 
than’-relation and ii) modal realism rules out spatiotemporal relations be-
tween objects that exist in different possible worlds. This is a problem, 
since the Lewisian theory is supposed to respect established ‘pre-philo-
sophical’ opinions about what is possible.3 
 It is crucial to Divers’s challenge that the comparisons in (1) – (3) in-
volve spatiotemporal magnitudes. Comparisons not involving them, such 
as for example, ‘It is true of the longest poem authored by a human that it 
might have been longer’, are not subject to Divers’s claim i): The magni-
tude involved here is that of the number of words or of letters in a poem 
and there is no reason to think that two poems which are comparable re-
garding their length so understood have to stand in spatiotemporal rela-
tions. For this reason, this and similar cases do not give rise to Divers’s 
challenge. As Divers himself points out, this means that a natural response 
to his challenge is to deny i) (lemma b in Divers 2014), i.e. the claim that 
modal comparisons of the sort drawn in (1) – (3) require the compared ob-
jects to stand in spatiotemporal relations. 
 According to Divers, friends of the Lewisian theory of modality who 
make this move have to face three difficulties. First, Divers suggests that 
this response might require extensive and deep revisions of their adopted 
metaphysics of spacetime and modality, second, it might give rise to re-
venge problems, and third, and finally, it appears that Lewis himself ex-
plicitly objected to a particularly natural response strategy which makes 
                                                          
3  See Divers (2013, 186). 
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this move. (See Divers 2014, 577.) The core idea of this response-strategy 
is that ‘we might simply instate inequalities between numbers in place of 
relations between non-numerical things. So x being taller than y requires 
‘only’ that there be numbers n and m such that …and n is greater than m’ 
(ibid.). My main aim in this paper is to argue that, even assuming a rela-
tively orthodox Lewisian perspective, none of these three difficulties pose 
a genuine problem for a response strategy of this sort. I will do that by 
developing a particular version of the strategy, which I will in the following 
call the Degree Strategy.4 
2. The Degree Strategy: the basic idea 
 The main aim of the Degree Strategy is to deliver satisfiable counterpart 
theoretic translations of Divers’s (1) and similar comparative sentences 
which involve comparisons between degrees instead of objects. To make 
this clearer, let me introduce a counterpart-theoretic rendering of (1) to give 
an example of how this might be done:  
 (D1) ∃v(Aa ∧ Tav ∧ ∀w∀x((Aw ∧ w ≠ a ∧ Twx) → x < v) ∧  
∃y(∃zCza ∧ Tzy ∧ v < y)) 
Here, a is a singular term,5 Cxy says that x is a counterpart of y, Txy says 
that x is tall to degree y, Ax says that x is actual, and < is the greater than-
relation for degrees. In words, (D1) hence says that there is a degree of 
tallness v, such that it is the degree of tallness of the actual thing a which 
is larger than the degree of tallness of any other actual thing, but that there 
is a counterpart of a which has a higher degree of tallness. The example 
                                                          
4  For a different response to Divers’s challenge, see Noonan & Jago (2017). 
5  The official language of counterpart theory as introduced in Lewis (1968) contains 
no singular terms, but rather treats names as definite descriptions in the manner descri-
bed in Russell (1905). The Russellian method requires one to fix the scope of the rele-
vant descriptions in modal contexts, as Lewis points out (ibid, 120f). Regarding the 
counterpart-theoretic sentences discussed in this paper, these descriptions can be 
assumed to take wide scope under the modal operator as discussed on p. 121 of ibid, 
since they correspond to de re modal claims. Officially, (D1) should hence be read as 
an abbreviation of the respective singular-term-free rendering. 
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reflects the two core ideas of the Degree Strategy: First, that comparisons 
of objects in terms of their spatiotemporal magnitudes can always be 
spelled out in the language of counterpart theory in terms of comparisons 
between degrees corresponding to these magnitudes. Second, that the re-
sulting counterpart theoretic-sentences do not require the objects whose 
magnitudes are being compared to be in the same possible world. Both of 
these ideas, modulo their application in counterpart theory, are well-known 
from the existing literature on the semantics of modal comparatives. (See 
e.g. Cresswell 1990, Ch. 5.)6 
 Note that in producing this translation of (1), I did not rely on the man-
ual for translating first-order modal logic into counterpart theory provided 
in Lewis (1968). Instead of first translating (1) into first order modal logic 
and then into counterpart theory, I rather directly relied on the resources of 
counterpart theory to produce (D1). I assume that this is a legitimate move 
from an orthodox Lewisian perspective, for two reasons. 
 First, the translation manual in Lewis (1968) was not intended to fix a 
general methodology for the use of counterpart theory, according to which 
the one and only way to arrive at Counterpart-Theoretic renderings of a 
modal sentences is to first translate them into the language of first-order 
modal logic and then to translate this first translation into the language of 
counterpart theory. Rather, Lewis introduced the translation manual to 
make an important point about the expressive strength of the language of 
counterpart theory: 
If the translation scheme I am about to propose is correct, every sen-
tence of quantified modal logic has the same meaning as a sentence of 
counterpart theory, its translation; but not every sentence of counterpart 
theory is, or is equivalent to, the translation of any sentence of quanti-
fied modal logic. Therefore, starting with a fixed stock of predicates 
                                                          
6  Note that (D1) is based on a simplistic implementation of a degree-based semantics 
for comparatives and that I make no claim that this implementation lives up to the best 
available linguistic theories of comparatives. (D1) should however serve the purposes 
of this paper well, since linguistically more sophisticated implementation of the Degree 
Strategy would have to face the same metaphysical questions which I will focus on in 
this paper. 
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other than those of counterpart theory, we can say more by adding coun-
terpart theory than we can by adding modal operators. (Lewis 1968, 
117)  
This point is part of his sales pitch for counterpart theory to philosophers 
who follow the standard approach to the formal treatment of modal sen-
tences in terms of first-order modal logic.7 A Lewisian who insisted that 
any translation of a modal sentence of natural language into the language 
of counterpart theory must proceed via the translation manual, would un-
dermine Lewis’s efforts in this direction, since this procedure would pre-
clude counterpart theorists from relying on the additional expressive re-
sources offered by their theory. The second reason is that Lewis himself 
later explicitly expressed a preference for working directly with the lan-
guage of counterpart theory.8 
                                                          
7  This reading is strongly suggested by the first two paragraphs of the paper: ‘We can 
conduct formalized discourse about most topics perfectly well bv means of our all-pur-
pose extensional logic, provided with predicates and a domain of quantification suited 
to the subject matter at hand. That is what we do when our topic is numbers, or sets, or 
wholes and parts, or strings of symbols. That is not what we do when our topic is mo-
dality: what might be and what must be, essence and accident. Then we introduce modal 
operators to create a special-purpose, nonextensional logic. Why this departure from 
our custom? Is it a historical accident, or was it forced on us somehow by the very 
nature of the topic of modality? It was not forced on us. We have an alternative. Instead 
of formalizing our modal discourse by means of modal operators, we could follow our 
usual practice. We could stick to our standard logic (quantification theory with identity 
and without ineliminable singular terms) and provide it with predicates and a domain 
of quantification suited to the topic of modality. That done, certain expressions are 
available which take the place of modal operators. The new predicates required, toget-
her with postulates on them, constitute the system I call counterpart theory.’ (Lewis 
1968, 113) 
8  ‘What is the correct counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the modal formulas of 
the standard language of quantified modal logic? – Who cares? We can make them 
mean whatever we like. We are their master. We needn’t be faithful to the meanings we 
learned at mother’s knee – because we didn’t. If this language of boxes and diamonds 
proves to be a clumsy instrument for talking about matters of essence and potentiality, 
let it go hang. Use the resources of modal realism directly to say what it would mean 
for Humphrey to be essentially human, or to exist contingently.’ (Lewis 1986, 12-13) 
See also the initial passage in Lewis (1993a, 69). 
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 A crucial question about the Degree Strategy is what degrees are. I will 
here assume that they are either numbers of whichever sort are semantically 
required, or in some more complicated cases, such as comparisons of e.g. 
similarity, ordered or unordered sets of (sets of …) numbers.9 I will also 
assume that comparative predicates which take degrees as at least one of 
their relata implicitly specify a particular measurement scale. Since Di-
vers’s challenge is based on comparative sentences involving simple com-
parisons which can be accounted for by single numbers instead of e.g. sets 
of them, I will for the most part focus on such cases. Further details of the 
Degree Strategy will be spelled out in the following subsections in direct 
response to Divers’s three worries.10 
3. Does the Degree Strategy require deep revisions  
of Lewisian metaphysics? 
 Divers’s first worry is that response strategies which are based on a denial 
of i) may ‘require extensive or deep revision’ (Divers 2014, 577) of Lewisian 
metaphysics of spacetime or modality. To address this worry for the Degree 
Strategy, we have to first make clear which metaphysical requirements this 
strategy imposes. Its three crucial metaphysical requirements are that a) it 
must accommodate the view that de re-ascriptions of predicates like ‘being 
tall’ to possible objects involve a degree of tallness, that b) degrees are com-
parable across different possible worlds via the ‘is (strictly) greater than’-re-
lation <, and finally, that c) the ordering of degrees induced by < tracks the 
ordering of the objects to which they are assigned relative to the relevant 
dimension of comparison. I take it that any substantial or extensive revision 
of Lewisian metaphysics which the Degree Strategy might require would be 
traceable to one or more of these three requirements. 
                                                          
9  See Balcerak Jackson & Penka (2017) for a critical discussion of this assumption 
in the context of linguistic theories utilising degrees. 
10  Note that Schwarzschild & Wilkinson (2002) argue that a linguistically adequate 
semantics for comparatives requires intervals, rather than degrees, but I will, for the 
sake of simplicity, stick with degrees. Since intervals are just sets of numbers, all points 
I am going to make about the degree-based version could easily be generalized to an 
intervals-based version. 
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 From an orthodox Lewisian perspective, requirement a) poses no spe-
cial metaphysical problem, since it indeed perfectly matches Lewis’s own 
view of ‘properties that admit of degree’ (Lewis 1986, 53), for which he 
suggests a bifurcated treatment: There are both ‘families of plain proper-
ties: the various lengths, the various masses’ and ‘relations to numbers, 
such as the mass-in-grams relation that (a recent temporal part of) Bruce 
bears to a number close to 4,500’ (ibid.). Accordingly, if an object has a 
mass, then it both has a plain mass-property and stands in various relations 
to numbers, each of which specifies its mass on a certain measurement 
scale. This means that proponents of the Degree Strategy can help them-
selves to relational properties which are already present in Lewis’s ontol-
ogy. Even the more complicated cases at which I hinted, which require de-
grees to e.g. be sets of numbers pose no problem in this regard. Lewis of 
course allowed sets of numbers in his ontology and relations between 
them.11 Requirement a) imposed by the degree theory hence entails no de-
viation from standard Lewisian metaphysics. 
 What about requirement b), the requirement that degrees are <-compa-
rable across different possible worlds? As just pointed out in response to 
the analogous question about requirement a), the degree theory is conserva-
tive regarding orthodox Lewisian ontology, in the sense that it does not 
require the introduction of new objects which do not already exist accord-
ing to Lewis. This means that the question can simply be answered by 
showing that orthodox Lewisian metaphysics satisfies requirement b), i.e. 
that it entails that degrees are <-comparable across different possible 
worlds. Or equivalently, and this is the way I will go here, by showing that 
Lewisian metaphysics cannot fail to meet the requirement. How could it 
fail to do so? By allowing for at least one of two kinds of variance, first, 
variance in which numbers, and sets (of sets …) of them, are available from 
the perspective of different possible worlds, or second, variance regarding 
which mathematical relations hold between them in different possible 
worlds. 
 We can immediately rule out that orthodox Lewisian metaphysics al-
lows for variance with respect to which degrees/numbers exist from the 
standpoint of possible worlds, since Lewis himself explicitly accepts that 
                                                          
11  They correspond to properties of numbers and relations which hold between pro-
perties of numbers respectively. See Lewis (1986, section 1.5, 50ff). 
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numbers are ‘necessary beings’ (Lewis 1983a, 198). By this, he doesn’t 
mean that they exist in every possible world. Rather, according to Lewis, 
‘numbers […] inhabit no particular world but exist alike from the stand-
point of all worlds, just as they have no location in time and space but 
exist alike from the standpoint of all times and places’ (Lewis 1973a, 39). 
Since degrees are numbers, or sets of them, the first kind of variance 
which could undermine requirement b) is not allowed by Lewisian meta-
physics.12 
 So what about variance regarding the mathematical relations in which 
degrees, or sets of them, stand from the perspective of different possible 
worlds? In case of single degrees, the relevant mathematical relation is of 
course <, the (strictly) greater than-relation. By Lewis’s lights, < is an in-
ternal relation between degrees, a relation which supervenes on the internal 
properties of its relata. This means that there can be no variance in whether 
two degrees are <-related between worlds. Let me explain this in a bit more 
detail. 
 To make this point, we need to look at Lewis’s definition of an internal 
relation. According to Lewis, a diadic relation, i.e. an ordered set with two 
elements in his ontology, is internal if, and only if, ‘whenever a and a’ are 
                                                          
12  In his later writings Lewis (1991) and (1993b), Lewis argues that, given ‘some 
hypotheses about the size of Reality’ (Lewis 1993b, 3), mathematical entities and the 
whole of mathematics can be reduced to megethology, that is, mereology plus plural 
quantification. There is one aspect of the resulting view which might seem to threaten 
the Degree Strategist’s ability to fulfill requirement b), namely Lewis’s neutrality re-
garding the question of whether sets and in particular the empty set, which serves as 
the basis for set-theoretical constructions of numbers, are spatiotemporally located 
(see Lewis 1993b, 13). A Lewisian who adopts Lewis’s view should hence be prepa-
red to at least seriously consider the idea that the empty set and with it also the 
numbers are in spacetime. Indeed, Lewis seriously considers, if not endorses, the idea 
of identifying the empty set with an arbitrary elementless object, e.g. with the fusion 
of all ordinary objects in a world (see Lewis 1993b, 9). Does this not mean that there 
are different empty sets and therefore also different numbers and different degrees in 
different possible worlds and does this not threaten the Degree Strategy? Not if the 
Lewisian also follows Lewis in adopting a structuralist view of mathematics (ibid. 
15-17). On this view, the same mathematical structure, e.g. that of the rational 
numbers, might indeed be instantiated by different objects in different possible wor-
lds, but since the structure remains the same across all possible worlds, degrees no-
netheless remain cross-world comparable. 
376  R O B E R T  M I C H E L S  
 
duplicates (or identical) and b and b′ are duplicates (or identical), then both 
or none of the pairs 〈a, b〉 and 〈a′, b′〉 stand in the relation.’13 For our pur-
poses, it is the identity-version of the definition which is relevant. This is 
so, because, as mentioned earlier, Lewis assumes that numbers don’t exist 
in possible worlds, but rather outside of them. (See Lewis 1973a, 39.) Since 
he nonetheless assumes that they should be available in all possible worlds, 
Lewis stipulates that with respect to each possible world, each number acts 
as its own unique counterpart, thereby making it de re necessary of them 
that they exist. (See Lewis 1973a, 40.) Since a duplicate of an object is 
either a distinct object in the same world or a counterpart in a different 
world which shares all of the object’s perfectly natural properties (see 
Lewis 1986, 61), this uniqueness assumption entails that the only duplicate 
of a number is that number itself. 
 Based on this explanation, we can apply the definition to the <-relation 
to show that it is satisfied. It tells us that for any two numbers n and m and 
any pair of their duplicates n′ and m′, < is an internal relation with respect 
to n and m if, and only if, either n < m and n′ < m′ hold or neither of n < m 
and n′ < m′ holds. Since we have just seen that n and n′ and m and m′ are 
identical, this is trivially the case, since m is either strictly greater than n, 
or not. So < qualifies as an internal relation between numbers because 
whether two numbers actually (or possibly) stand in < settles once and for 
all whether they stand in the relation with respect to all possible worlds. 
This of course rules out the problematic cross-world variance in whether 
degrees are <-related. 
 An important question is still left unanswered, namely whether this 
mathematical ordering between degrees successfully tracks the relevant di-
mension of comparison. This is exactly the question at issue regarding re-
quirement c). To meet this requirement, Lewisians have to ensure that e.g. 
an actual object associated with a height-degree higher up in the <-ordering 
than an object in a non-actual world also has a greater (plain) height than 
the non-actual object. 
 According to Lewis’s view, deviant cases in which this is not the case 
can only arise if there is a mismatch between the object’s relevant plain 
                                                          
13  Lewis (1983b, 356, footnote 16). Note that Lewis switched from using the term 
‘intrinsic relations’ in this definition to ‘internal relations’ in Lewis (1986); I follow the 
latter usage. 
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measurable property and at least one of its corresponding relational  
properties involving numbers. Degree strategists can therefore avoid the 
problem by ruling out such deviant cases. They have at least two different 
ways to do this, one more and one slightly less orthodox. 
 Let me introduce the slightly less orthodox solution first. It requires one 
to build a further factor into the degree-based semantics for gradable ad-
jectives, a factor which enforces the required harmonious relation between 
the degrees associated with the compared object and their corresponding 
intrinsic properties. This factor could for example be a relation which maps 
equivalence classes of possible objects to sets of numbers which capture 
their relevant dimensions on different scales. Height for example would 
then be treated as a relational property of an object which both involves a 
degree and a scaling relation, a mapping of all objects of the same height 
to the relevant degrees, all of course relative to a particular measurement 
scale. To give an example, if a is an object with e.g. a height of three me-
ters, this would mean that the relational property salient to evaluating the 
truth of a sentence comparing a’s height to another possible object would 
involve the number representing a’s degree-in-metres and a scaling relation 
which maps a set of possible objects which have the same intrinsic height-
property as a (i.e. its height-duplicates) to the same number representing 
its degree-in-metres, which in the given example would be 3. In this mod-
ified framework, the deviant cases which degree strategists have to rule out 
would involve a mismatch between the scaling relations involved in the 
relational properties involved in their analysis of the relevant comparative 
sentences. Such cases could therefore be ruled out by stipulating that only 
those comparisons are apt to be true which involve the relevant relational 
properties which involve the same scaling relation.14 
                                                          
14  One might worry that there is a threat to this approach from possible worlds which 
are very different from the actual world regarding the quantitative properties of the ob-
jects existing in those worlds. A simple example of such a world is one in which all 
height-properties have always been exactly double that of the actual height-properties. 
This case is e.g. discussed in Dasgupta (2013). One might argue that height-compari-
sons between objects in this and the actual world might undermine the proposed modi-
fication of the Degree Strategy, since e.g. an actual object and an object from this ‘he-
ight-doubled’ world might be scaled to the same height-in-metres, giving rise to cases 
in which the latter object has a lower height-in-metres but has a larger intrinsic height 
than the actual object. A simple way to address potential problem cases of this sort is 
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 This modification of the Degree Strategy also requires no deep revi-
sions of Lewisian metaphysics. The scaling relations on which it relies are 
metaphysically innocent in the sense that they are just regular relations 
whose availability is guaranteed by the Lewisians commitment to an abun-
dant view of relations. This means that the further relativization of gradable 
properties to scaling relations poses no special metaphysical problem over 
and above those posed by the relativization of gradable properties to de-
grees, a relativization which is already built into Lewisian metaphysics. 
Since the same holds for the doubly-relativized properties, Lewisians who 
rely on the Degree Strategy can meet requirement c) without having to re-
vise their fundamental metaphysics in any significant way. Why then did I 
call this variant of the Degree Strategy slightly less orthodox? Because it 
requires degree theorists to rely on relations which, while ontologically un-
problematic, are not the simple relations between material objects and 
numbers which Lewis officially accepts. (See again Lewis 1986, 53.) 
 The second, more conservative, way to rule out deviant cases leaves the 
original degree-theoretic semantics as it is and lets the counterpart relation 
do all the work. In various places, Lewis relies on an ordering of possible 
worlds regarding their similarity to the actual world. (See e.g. Lewis 
1973a.) Such an ordering can be used to restrict the set of relevant counter-
parts with respect to a particular comparative sentence to those which exist 
in worlds which are closest to the actual world regarding the measurement 
structure of the relevant intrinsic quantitative properties. Accordingly, the 
objects whose degrees are compared in a Degree Strategic translation of 
such a sentence are always guaranteed to be in worlds which agree on the 
scaling between the degrees to which they have the relevant spatiotemporal 
magnitude and their corresponding intrinsic properties. More could of 
course be said about this and the preceding proposal, but this brief sketches 
together with what was just said about requirements a) and b) should suf-
fice to illustrate that Lewisians have more than enough resources to imple-
ment a version of the Degree Strategy without deeply or extensively revis-
ing their metaphysics. 
                                                          
to invoke a similarity ordering between possible worlds of the sort used to formulate 
the theory of counterfactuals in Lewis (1973a). The idea would be to rule out that ob-
jects from worlds of this sort can enter into comparisons with actual objects. 
 C R O S S - W O R L D  C O M P A R A T I V E S  F O R  M O D A L  R E A L I S T S  379 
 
4. A revenge-problem? 
 Divers’s second worry is that the problem illustrated by (1) and similar 
comparative sentences could be reinstated for the degree-strategist’s surro-
gate-relation <, the (strictly) greater than-relation. In the background again 
is Divers’s assumption i), which says that any two objects need to be spa-
tiotemporally related in order to give us a true instance of a comparative 
predicate like ‘is taller than’. 
 The degree-strategy explicitly denies that objects need to be spatiote-
morally related in order for them to be comparable regarding their spati-
otemporal magnitudes. But it does say that the corresponding degrees 
have to stand in a comparative relation such as <. In order to address this 
second worry, it still needs to be shown that this latter claim does not 
entail that the object and its counterpart involved in a (1)-like compara-
tive sentence have to be in the same possible world. This entailment could 
hold in two cases: First, that two degrees are <-related could imply that 
they have to exist in the same world. Second, that they are so related 
could imply that the objects to which they stand in a particular magni-
tude-on-a-particular-scale-relation have to exist in the same world. I will 
address both versions of the worry in turn. 
 Let us first focus on the idea that the fact that the two degrees of lengths, 
velocities, heights, and so on which are associated with two comparable 
objects are <-related implies that the degrees have to be located in the same 
spacetime. This first version of the worry can easily be dismissed. Given 
the assumption that degrees are numbers, they are not in spacetime at all 
and can hence themselves not stand in spatiotemporal relations. (See again 
Lewis 1973a, 39-40.) 
 But what about the compared objects, i.e. what about the second version 
of the worry? That e.g. the height-degree associated with one object is 
higher up on the <-ordering than the height-degree associated with another 
indeed implies that each of the two objects is in spacetime. This is so, 
simply because only an object which is in a spacetime can have e.g. the 
intrinsic mass-property which it has in addition to being related to a certain 
numbers via a relation such as mass-in-grams. (See again Lewis 1986, 53.) 
Accordingly, the Degree Strategy cannot completely stay clear of meta-
physical claims about the compared objects themselves. That however does 
not mean that Divers’s second worry amounts to a genuine problem for the 
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Degree Strategy. One of the core ideas of the strategy is that while each 
compared object has to be in a spacetime, this need not be the same 
spacetime for each of the objects. This is illustrated by degree theoretic 
translations such as (D1). The Degree Strategy is hence not subject to the 
second version of the worry either. 
 One might argue that this is not yet enough to comprehensively address 
Divers’s second worry. So far, I have equated being in a possible world 
with being in a spacetime. But in Lewisian metaphysics, being in a 
spacetime is only a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for being in a 
possible world. A core idea of modal realism is that in order to form a pos-
sible world, a collection of (possible) objects needs to be ‘glued together’ 
by a special family of relations. Lewis is forced to reject the attractive idea 
that the ‘glue’-role is played exclusively by the actual spatiotemporal rela-
tions, because he wants to allow possible worlds that are instead ‘glued 
together’ by relations other than them, such as for example the quasi-spa-
tiotemporal relations of Newtonian physics. (See Lewis 1986, 74-76.) So 
there are possible worlds which are not spacetime in the sense of contem-
porary physics. (1)-like problem cases could therefore still arise if the 
Degree Strategic treatment of modal comparatives implied that the rele-
vant objects stand in ‘analogically spatiotemporal’ (Lewis 1986, 76), ra-
ther than spatiotemporal relations. 
 What does it take for a relation to be analogically spatiotemporal? Ac-
cording to Lewis, such relations have four characteristic properties, namely 
that of being natural, pervasive, discriminating and external. (See Lewis 
1986, 75-76.) To address the objection, I will now argue that the relations 
between compared objects to which the Degree Strategy is committed do 
not conform to this characterization. 
 The first crucial point here is that < itself is not analogically spatiotem-
poral, since it is, for the reason given in the previous section, an internal 
rather than an external relation between numbers. This means that the gen-
eralization of the first version of the worry to analogically spatiotemporal 
relations also fails to pose a problem for the Degree Strategy. 
 This still leaves open the possibility that the Degree Strategy implies 
that an analogically spatiotemporal relation obtains between the compared 
objects themselves, instead of between their associated degrees. To address 
this generalization of the second version of Divers’s worry, we first have 
to get clearer on what the Degree Strategy tells us about the relations which 
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holds between compared objects. According to the strategy, to evaluate 
modal comparatives involving spatiotemporal magnitudes such as (1), one 
has to take into consideration the degrees to which the objects which ex-
hibit these magnitudes are related. Since Lewisian metaphysics operates 
with an abundant conception of properties and relations, (see e.g. Lewis 
1983b, 346) that the Degree Strategists is committed to the claim that the 
degrees associated with compared objects are <-related means that it is also 
committed to the claim that these objects themselves stand in a relation. 
 What sort of relation is this? Informally, it could best be described as 
the ‘is associated with a degree higher up on the <-ordering than the degree 
associated with’-relation. Does this relation qualify as analogically spatio-
temporal? One reason to think that this is not the case is that it is plausibly 
not a natural relation in Lewis’s sense, since it does not ‘carve reality at the 
joints’ (Lewis 1983b, 346). This response might not satisfy all critics of the 
Degree Strategy, since it is based on an intuitive judgement about whether 
this relation is natural and such intuitive judgements are notoriously con-
troversial. 
 Fortunately, there is a less intuition-dependent version of the response. 
According to Lewis, a relation can be denied the status of naturalness if 
positing its existence would be superfluous since ‘we have the resources to 
introduce it by definition’ (Lewis 1986, 77). It is easy to see that the relation 
which the Degree Strategy requires to hold between two compared objects 
fails to be natural by this standard: As its name says, two objects stand in 
it if, and only if, the relevant degree associated with the first is higher up 
on the <-ordering than the relevant degree associated with the second ob-
ject. This relation is fully definable in terms of the relation which holds 
between the degrees. It is therefore not natural and for that reason also 
not analogically spatiotemporal.15 
                                                          
15  While Lewis himself somewhat hesitantly accepts naturalness as a necessary condi-
tion for analogical spatiotemporality in Lewis (1986, Section 1.6), Bricker (1996) de-
fends the view that the only constraint placed on ‘world-glue’-relations is that they have 
to be external. If ‘is associated with a degree higher up on the <-order than the degree 
associated with’ is an external relation, then a degree strategist who accepted Bricker’s 
view would be forced to admit that it can be a ‘world-glue’-relation, i.e. analogically 
spatiotemporal. Degree strategists can simply reject Bricker’s view and side with Lewis 
to avoid this potential problem, but perhaps there is an argument to be made that the ‘is 
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 To summarize the argument of this section: Divers’s worry is that the 
same problem which he illustrated using (1) – (3) might also arise based on 
the relations which the Degree Strategy requires to hold between either de-
grees associated with compared objects, or these objects themselves. A re-
venge-problem of this kind could arise if these relations implied that either 
the degrees or the objects involved have to be in the same possible world. 
The point made here is that neither the <-relation between degrees itself, 
nor the relation it induces between the objects associated with these degrees 
is a relation of the sort which could give rise to such a problem. 
 A possible objection one might raise against this conclusion is that the 
arguments provided fail to support it, since they focus on the wrong sort of 
relation. The idea of the objection is to insist that the relation which holds 
between two objects which we compare regarding e.g. their height must 
involve the intrinsic height-properties which objects have according to 
Lewis. (See e.g. Lewis 1986, 242.) But, the objection goes, the Degree 
Strategy completely ignores these intrinsic height-properties of objects and 
relies on a comparison by proxy via the <-relation. 
 I have two things to say in response to this objection. First, in one sense, 
it begs the question against the Degree Strategy. The basic idea of the  
strategy is exactly to provide a semantic analysis which does not involve 
the sort of relation which according to the objector, it should involve. 
                                                          
associated with a degree …’-relation is not external. According to Lewis, external rela-
tions ‘supervene on the intrinsic nature of the composite of the relata taken together’ 
(Lewis 1986, 62). As pointed out earlier, Lewis thinks that objects which e.g. have a 
size have both a non-relational size-property and stand in relations to numbers which 
give us their size on different measurement scales. (See Lewis 1986, 53.) Lewis assumes 
that the non-relational size-properties are internal (see e.g. Lewis 1983b, 355), but it is 
clear that the relations between objects and the relevant numbers/degrees are not internal, 
since they do not supervene on the natures of the objects and numbers/degrees taken se-
parately. To put it differently: it is not part of the internal nature of an object that it is 
associated with the degree of e.g. height-in-meters with which it is associated. This means 
that it is not part of the intrinsic nature of the composite of any two objects that they stand 
in the ‘is associated with a degree …’-relation, which in turn means that the relation is not 
external. Things would look different if we were talking about a relation which held be-
tween complexes involving both the relevant objects and their associated degrees, but the 
‘is associated with a degree …’-relation is a relation which holds between objects, not 
between such complexes. Such complexes are also arguably not the kind of entities which 
are subject to the modal realists’ ban on cross-world relations. 
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 Second, I nonetheless think that the objection points to a legitimate 
question which the Degree Strategy should acknowledge and try to answer, 
namely: Is it really unproblematic to exclusively rely on degrees instead of 
on the corresponding intrinsic properties when trying to account for the 
truth of sentences involving cross-world comparisons? A natural way of 
making this question more precise is to spell it out in terms of possible 
variances in the relation between e.g. intrinsic height-properties of objects 
and the relations to degrees of height on a certain scape in which they stand. 
So understood, the question is identical to the question regarding require-
ment c) which I have already addressed in the previous section. Either way, 
the objection fails to undermine the answer to Divers’s revenge-worry 
given in this section. 
5. Lewis’s objection to degree-based semantics  
for modal comparatives 
 Divers final worry refers to an explicit discussion of modal compara-
tives in Lewis (1986, 13). To see what to make of this final worry, we 
should take a closer look at what Lewis writes in the passage to which Di-
vers refers. As will become clear shortly, it makes sense to quote this pas-
sage at length: 
In any case, modality is not all diamonds and boxes. Ordinary language 
has modal idioms that outrun the resources of standard modal logic, 
though of course you will be able to propose extensions. […] 
There are modalised comparatives: a red thing could resemble an or-
ange thing more closely than a red thing could resemble a blue thing. I 
analyse that as a quantified statement of comparative resemblance in-
volving coloured things which may be parts of different worlds. 
For some x and y (x is red and y is orange and for all u and v (if u is 
red and v is blue, then x resembles y more than u resembles v)) 
Try saying that in standard modal logic. The problem is that formulas 
get evaluated relative to a world, which leaves no room for cross-world 
comparisons. 
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Maybe you can solve the problem if you replace the original compara-
tive relation ‘…resembles…more than…resembles…’ by some fancy 
analysis of it, say in terms of numerical measures of degrees of resem-
blance and numerical inequalities of these degrees. After that, you 
might be able to do the rest with boxes and diamonds. The fancy anal-
ysis might be correct. But still, I suggest that your solution is no fair. 
For that’s not how the English does it. The English does not introduce 
degrees of resemblance. It sticks with the original comparative relation, 
and modalises it with the auxiliary ‘could’. But this ‘could’ does not be-
have like the standard sentence-modifying diamond, making a sentence 
which is true if the modified sentence could be true. I think its effect is 
to unrestrict quantifiers which would normally range over this-worldly 
things. The moral for me is that we’d better have other-worldly things 
to quantify over. I suppose the moral for a friend of primitive modality 
is that he has more on his plate than he thinks he has: other primitive 
modal idioms than just his boxes and diamonds. (Lewis 1986, 13-14; 
my italics.) 
 In the crucial italicized part of this passage, Lewis first objects to a se-
mantics which introduces degrees into the language of first-order modal 
logic in order to account for modal comparatives and then argues that a 
semantics based on his theory of modality better captures the behaviour of 
modal comparatives in English. The discussion of both theories is not gen-
eral, but rather focuses on particular modal comparative sentences, namely 
those involving comparisons of resemblance between colours. It is therefore 
not at all clear whether Lewis intended this passage to provide a general 
critique of degree-based semantics for modal comparatives. Based on the 
quoted passage alone, Divers’s claim that ‘the Lewisian who would do so 
[account for modal comparatives using inequalities between numerical de-
grees instead of relations between the compared objects] must take into 
account that Lewis (1986, 13) resists this approach to modal comparatives 
in general and why he does so’ (Divers 2014, 577) should therefore be 
taken with a grain of salt.16 
                                                          
16  Note that Forbes (1994, 39) also seems to accept that Lewis at least meant the ‘that’s 
not how the English does it’-part to apply to degree-based theories of comparatives in 
general. 
 C R O S S - W O R L D  C O M P A R A T I V E S  F O R  M O D A L  R E A L I S T S  385 
 
 While the textual evidence fails to conclusively settle the question of 
relevance, there are two reasons to think that there is still something to 
Divers’s worry and that Degree Strategists have to consider and address the 
points about degrees made in the italicized part of the quotation. 
 First, even if it were settled that Lewis did not intend this passage as a 
general critique of degree-based semantics for modal comparatives, the 
points he makes might of course still pose a problem for the Degree Strat-
egy. 
 Second, one may argue that even though Lewis did not explicitly say 
so in this passage, he must have intended the objection to apply to all 
degree-based semantics of modal comparatives, since he himself pro-
posed a rival semantics for comparatives at the end of his Lewis (1970). 
The semantics Lewis sketches there is a supervaluationist semantics 
which introduces a delineation-coordinate as an additional contextual pa-
rameter, ‘a sequence of boundary-specifying numbers’ (Lewis 1970, 65), 
relative to which sentences are evaluated.17 Crucially, this semantics does 
not rely on degrees.18 
 The relevant part of the quote is the italicized passage immediately fol-
lowing Lewis’s concession that a degree-based analysis might produce the 
right semantic results. This passage contains two claims which Degree 
Strategists should consider. The first claim is about the semantics of com-
paratives embedded under ‘could’, the second claim about the semantics of 
‘could’ in this particular context. Both are linguistic claims about a partic-
ular language, namely English, but the second claim also clearly reflects a 
distinctive aspect of the Lewisian theory of modality. I will now discuss 
both claims in turn. 
 The first claim is a claim about the logical form of particular English 
claims containing modal comparatives. (‘The English does not introduce 
                                                          
17  The basic idea of the semantics is that a comparative sentence of the form ‘x is F-
er than y.’ is true if, and only if, the set of delineations relative to which y is F is a proper 
subset of the set of delineations in which x is F. See Lewis (1970, 64-65). 
18  It should be noted however that von Stechow argues that Lewis’s (1970) semantics 
is ‘virtually identical’ (von Stechow 1984, 10) to Seuren’s (1973) semantics of compa-
ratives, meaning that the two semantic theories produce equivalent results. Seuren’s 
semantics relies on extent variables which range over sets of degrees. This suggests that 
at least as far as the semantic analysis it produces is concerned, there is no substantial 
difference between Lewis’s theory and a theory which (indirectly) relies on degrees. 
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degrees of resemblance. It sticks with the original comparative relation, 
and modalises it with the auxiliary “could”.’) Now while there are many 
interesting philosophical questions tied to a Lewisian approach to meaning 
in general (see for example Schwarz 2014, Weatherson 2013), the most 
direct way to answer this particular complaint about degree-based treat-
ments of modal comparatives is to reply in kind and to simply point out 
that it is falsified, both regarding its negative and its positive sub-claim, by 
recent work done on comparatives in linguistics. The degree-based ap-
proach, of which the Degree Strategy is a variant, is a proven standard ap-
proach to the semantics of comparatives in natural language semantics. 
(See e.g. von Stechow 1984, Kennedy 2005, Schwarzschild 2008.) From 
the perspective of linguistics, a perspective invoked by Lewis himself in 
the quoted passage by referring to what ‘the English’ does, there is hence 
no good reason to accept his first claim. So even assuming that Divers’s 
general reading of Lewis is correct, Degree Strategists would arguably be 
able to live with this departure from what in this case would be Lewisian 
orthodoxy. 
 This leaves Lewis’s second claim in the italicized part of the quote. Like 
the first claim, it consists of a negative and a positive sub-claim. 
 The negative sub-claim is that in the particular comparative structure 
which Lewis discusses, ‘could’ does not behave like the possibility-operator; 
it does not introduce a possible world, relative to which a comparative phrase 
is to be evaluated. It should come as no surprise that Degree Strategists fully 
agree with this claim. After all, they too work with the language of Lewis’s 
counterpart theory instead of the language of first-order modal logic. 
 The positive sub-claim is a claim about the functioning of ‘could’ in this 
context. Lewis writes about this modal auxiliary verb that ‘its effect is to 
unrestrict quantifiers which would normally range over this-worldly 
things.’ This is a generic claim about quantifiers, which strictly speaking 
leaves it open whether Lewis refers to quantifiers which quantify into the 
‘original comparative relation’ or more generally quantifiers involved in 
the semantic analysis. If the more specific reading is correct, then Lewis’s 
claim is simply irrelevant to the Degree Strategy, since Degree Strategists 
do not directly quantify into e.g. a taller-than relation which holds directly 
between two objects. 
 If we instead read it as a genuinely generic claim about the quantifiers 
involved in the semantic analysis of a modal comparative sentence of the 
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sort discussed in the quote, then again, the degree strategist is in full agree-
ment with Lewis. Quantifiers are per default unrestricted in counterpart 
theory, but can easily be restricted, e.g. to particular worlds. (See e.g. Lewis 
1986, 113.) In Degree Strategic translations of modal comparative sen-
tences, ‘could’ is indeed taken to act in the way envisaged by Lewis. Con-
sider (D1) again: 
 (D1) ∃v(Aa ∧ Tav ∧ ∀w∀x((Aw ∧ w ≠ a ∧ Twx) → x < v) ∧  
∃y(∃zCza ∧ Tzy ∧ v < y)) 
In (D1), the existential quantifier which binds the variable v ranges only 
over the degrees of tallness of actual objects in the first main conjunct, but 
then unrestrictedly over all degrees of tallness in the second conjunct, i.e. 
in the part which translates the ‘could’-claim. So this Degree Strategic 
translation is perfectly in line with the positive part of Lewis’s second 
claim.19 
 To sum up, Divers’s third worry, the worry related to what Lewis writes 
about modal comparatives in Lewis (1986) on p. 13 does not substantially 
threaten the Degree Strategy. Putting interpretative problems aside for the 
                                                          
19  It should be pointed out that (D1) is not the only translation of (1) available to 
proponents of the Degree Strategy. Since I assume, as pointed out in section 2, that 
Lewisians need not translate modal sentences from natural language into first-order 
modal logic in order to then translate the resulting sentence, using the schema provi-
ded in (Lewis 1968), into the language of counterpart theory, they could for example 
instead settle for: 
 (D1*) ∃u(Aa ∧ Tau ∧ ∀v∀w((Av ∧ v ≠ a ∧ Tvw) → w < u) ∧ ∃x(∃yWy ∧ ∃zIzy ∧  
Cza ∧ Tzx ∧ u < x)) 
 This alternative translation differs from (D1) in that its second conjunct now expli-
citly states, using Wx to say that x is a possible world and Ixy to say that x is in y, that 
there is a possible world which contains the counterpart of the actual largest thing 𝑎𝑎. 
 The alternative translation hence has the advantage of making it more explicit that 
the object and its counterpart may be in different possible worlds. This advantage is 
however not at all lost to Degree Strategists who stick to (D1). Given Lewis’s (1968) 
postulates P1, which says that nothing is in anything except a world, and P3, which says 
that all counterparts are in something, (D1*) is entailed by (D1). So they will still be 
able to use (D1*) in order to illustrate this aspect of their strategy. 
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moment, Degree Theories have to deviate from Lewis as Divers under-
stands him regarding one of his two claims, but have a good reason to do 
so. The other claim also poses no problem since, depending on how one 
understands it, it is either partly irrelevant to and partly compatible, or 
wholly compatible with the Degree Strategy. 
6. Two further questions about the Degree Strategy 
 While the previous section completes my response to Divers’s three 
worries about degree-based responses to his objection to the Lewisian the-
ory of modality, the particular example from the quote from Lewis (1986) 
discussed in the previous section raises two interesting question about the 
scope of the Degree Strategy.20 
 Lewis’s example is that of a modal comparison of resemblances be-
tween coloured objects. (See once again Lewis 1986, 13.) The first ques-
tion tied to this example is of how degree strategists might handle compar-
isons of colour. The second, how they might handle comparatives like ‘w 
resembles x more than y resembles z’ which involve multiple dimensions 
of comparison, e.g. resemblance with respect to colour, shape, size, …. 
 The first question can be answered rather straight-forwardly: To com-
pare colours, Degree Strategists can rely on regions in colours spaces as 
their degrees. Regions in colour spaces can be represented numerically by 
sets of tuples of numbers (e.g. in sRGB color space as 4-tuples involving 
real numbers representing values for red, green, blue, and specifying a 
white point) and the distances between them can be measured accord-
ingly.21 Degree strategists can then again rely e.g. on the similarity-relation 
between worlds in order to ensure comparability of colour-spaces across 
different possible worlds. 
 The second question however is much harder to answer: To be fully 
specific, a Degree Strategic treatment of comparisons of resemblance or 
                                                          
20  Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting me to discuss these questions. 
21  Representations of colour spaces of this sort play a major role in efforts to assure 
consistent colour representations across different display devices. For more information 
on this, see e.g. the website of the International Color Consortium http://www.co-
lor.org/. 
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more generally, comparative concepts which involve multiple dimensions 
of comparisons, would require an effective procedure to aggregate the rel-
evant dimensions of comparison into a single ordering of the relevant  
degrees. Procedures of this sort are of crucial importance in several differ-
ent philosophical contexts, including e.g. the theory of social choice (see 
e.g. List 2013), but notably also at a core junction in Lewis’s own philoso-
phy. The question of how to aggregate aspects of comparative similarity 
between possible worlds is an important question about his theory of coun-
terfactuals which crucially relies on this notion of similarity. Lewis dis-
cusses this question in several of his works, (see e.g. Lewis 1973a, Section 
4.2, 91ff; 1973b; 1979; see also Kroedel & Huber 2013 and Morreau 2010) 
but I will not attempt to begin to settle in how far Degree Strategists can 
make use of these discussions to help them answer the second question. 
Suffice it to say that while Degree Strategists still appear to have their work 
cut out for them, this further challenge is distinct from, and arguably goes 
beyond the challenge raised by Divers (2014) which is the main focal point 
of this paper. 
7. Conclusion 
 To conclude, the Degree Strategy is not directly threatened by any of 
the three worries raised by Divers: It does not require deep or extensive 
revisions of Lewisian metaphysics, is not subject to a revenge problem in-
duced by a relation between degrees or objects which are compared regard-
ing e.g. their degrees of height, mass, or of another spatiotemporal quantity, 
and is also not seriously threatened by Lewis’s remark on the treatment of 
modal comparatives which Divers cites. The Degree Strategy is therefore 
a live option for Lewisians who are looking for a way to address the general 
question underlying Divers’s (2014) challenge, the question of whether 
they can account for the truth of counterpart-theoretic sentences involving 
comparisons between spatiotemporal magnitudes of material object in dif-
ferent possible world. 
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